A Pro-UBI Talking Point Debunked

“Perhaps the robot apocalypse really will come at some point. Perhaps not. But what is clear is that it hasnโ€™t come yet. Until it does, we should target our aid to Americans in need โ€“ not to the entire population.” ~ Nick Buffie

Back in 2013, the Washington Post ran the headline: โ€œThinking Utopian: How About a Universal Basic Income [UBI]?โ€ The article was written as a thought experiment; it concluded that while a UBI may be worth pursuing in the future, โ€œright now doesnโ€™t seem like the ideal time for Utopian thinking.โ€

But just eight years later, UBI โ€“ the proposition that all Americans should receive an unconditional cash transfer from the government โ€“ has gone mainstream. Unfortunately, so too have its bad talking points.

Proponents often frame UBI as a response to automation, suggesting that universal government handouts will become necessary in a world without work. They may be right. But many UBI advocates have gone beyond this futuristic argument, claiming instead that weโ€™re already living in a work-barren country.

To advance this argument, proponents have often cited the economyโ€™s low labor force participation rate (LFPR). Andrew Yang, the first presidential candidate to push for a UBI, used this talking point a number of times, including in a 2018 interview on the Ezra Klein Show:

โ€œOur labor force participation rate started dropping as soon as we started getting rid of manufacturing workers in large numbers. Whereas weโ€™re talking today, the labor force participation rate is 62.9 percent, which is a multi-decade lowโ€ (19:40-19:54).

This argument is technically true, yet highly misleading. To see why, there are two facts we need to know about the LFPR.

First, the LFPR is not a measure of employment. The LFPR calculates the sum of employed and unemployed individuals as a share of the population. Americans are counted as employed if they have a job; as unemployed if they are out of work, want to work, are available to work now, and have searched for work in the past four weeks; and as not in the labor force if they are out of work and donโ€™t match the aforementioned criteria for being counted as unemployed.

This means that a high LFPR is possible even in the face of low employment. For example, a society in which 40 percent of the population was employed and 40 percent was unemployed would boast a LFPR of 80 percent. Ironically, it would have the same LFPR as a society in which 75 percent of the population was employed and only 5 percent was unemployed. So by itself, the LFPR tells us nothing about employment, joblessness, or the general strength of the labor market.

Second, the official LFPR doesnโ€™t account for the aging of the population; it includes all Americans ages 16 and older. If a growing share of the population hits retirement age and chooses to stop working, the LFPR will fall even if job prospects havenโ€™t worsened for most working-age people.

If you were oblivious to these points, you would look at the LFPR and conclude that the labor market has weakened in recent decades. From 1948-1968, the LFPR stayed just under 60 percent; it broke that threshold in 1969 and eventually peaked at 67.1 percent from 1997-2000. It then fell precipitously during the 2001 and 2008-2009 recessions, and had returned to its historical average of 62.9 percent when Yang gave his interview. (I exclude 2020 from the graph below in order to get a sense of the pre-Covid strength of the labor market. Yang gave his interview in 2018.)

The prime-age employment rate โ€“ the share of 25-54 year-olds with a job โ€“ tells a different story. By this metric, the pre-Covid labor market was hardly lacking for jobs. In 2019, the prime-age employment rate was 80.0 percent โ€“ the seventh-highest rate in American history, surpassed only by the six-year window ranging from 1996-2001. (Ironically for UBI supporters fretting about technological job displacement, the strongest labor market in U.S. history coincided with rising productivity and a huge boom in technology.) The employment rate of Americans in their prime working years has ranged from 62.1 percent in 1949 to 81.5 percent in 2000; yet as the graph below shows, employment was just below its all-time peak before Covid hit.

Granted, there is still a problem of declining employment among prime-age men. As Yang correctly pointed out in his interview, manufacturing jobs have gradually been disappearing in recent decades. Manufacturing peaked as a share of total employment in 1943 and in absolute terms in 1979. The subsequent decline has done immense harm to the affected male workers: Roughly half of prime-age men not in the labor force take daily pain medication, and many report a loss of meaning and purpose in their lives.

But this is a far more concentrated problem than a fictitious economy-wide plunge in employment. Since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking employment data in 1948, the prime-age employment rate has declined 7.6 percentage-points for men, yet has risen 39.9 percentage points for women. Similarly, since manufacturing employment peaked in absolute terms in 1979, the male prime-age employment rate has fallen 4.7 percentage points, while the female rate has increased 14.6 percentage points โ€“ nearly three times as much.

Perhaps the robot apocalypse really will come at some point. Perhaps not. But what is clear is that it hasnโ€™t come yet. Until it does, we should target our aid to Americans in need โ€“ not to the entire population.



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